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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
Amelia Woessner ("Woessner") appeals from the grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the two remaining 
defendants in this diversity action -- Inter national 
Switchboard Corporation ("International Switchboard") and 
Olsen Engineering Corporation ("Olsen"). She contends that 
the District Court erred in its analysis of New Jersey's 
choice of law doctrine by applying Delaware's builder's 
statute, 10 Del. Code S 8127, to bar her pr oducts liability 
claims. Furthermore, Woessner ar gues that neither the 
builder's statute of Delaware nor New Jersey should 
preclude her action because her injuries wer e the result of 
alleged defects in production machinery and therefore were 
not covered by the scope of either builder's statute. We 
affirm the grant of summary judgment of the District Court 
because it properly applied Delaware law in this case and 
correctly found that Delaware's builder's statute precluded 
Woessner's cause of action. 
 
I. Factual and Procedural History 
 
In 1972, Cardox, Inc. ("Cardox") planned the construction 
of a carbon dioxide recovery plant adjacent to its existing 
facilities in Delaware City, Delaware. Car dox contracted 
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with Olsen to provide design and engineering services for 
that construction. One component of the construction was 
a 2,300 volt motor control center, also known as a 
switchgear. That motor control center was manufactured by 
International Switchboard to the specifications demanded 
by Olsen and was integrated into the production process of 
the facility in 1973. Cardox was later acquir ed by Air 
Liquide, Inc. ("Air Liquide"), a Delawar e corporation, which 
continued to operate the facility. 
 
Woessner was employed as a field technician by "D" 
Electric Motors (" `D' Electric") on July 29, 1994, the day of 
her injury. "D" Electric is located in V ineland, New Jersey 
and Woessner is a New Jersey resident. In her capacity as 
a field technician, Woessner visited Air Liquide at its 
request on that day to provide an evaluation of a motor that 
was not functioning. Unable to make repairs to the motor 
on site, Woessner sought to remove it for repair at the "D" 
Electric facility in New Jersey. Before r emoving the motor, 
Air Liquide officials asked Woessner to evaluate the 
attached motor control center. While examining the motor 
control center with an electrical tester , Woessner was 
severely burned by an explosion. 
 
This products liability action was brought by Woessner in 
1996, alleging that the motor control center was defective in 
that it contained exposed electrical components. 
Jurisdiction was based on the diversity of the parties. 28 
U.S.C. S 1332. The District Court made two determinations 
relevant to this appeal. On January 7, 1999, the Court 
granted the motion of International Switchboar d to 
establish that the law of Delaware will gover n the 
determination of liability. On March 17, 1999, the Court 
then granted summary judgment in favor of Olsen and 
International Switchboard, predicting that Delaware's 
builder's statute would bar Woessner's claims against them. 
All of the defendants not involved in this appeal, including 
"D" Electric, General Electric Co. and Car dox, have either 
settled or been dismissed from this action, and thus the 
entry of summary judgment was a final order which is ripe 
for appeal to this Court. 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
II. Standard of Review 
 
The District Court's grant of summary judgment is 
subject to plenary review in this Court. Hurley v. Atlantic 
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City Police Dept., 174 F.3d 95, 128 n.29 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. 
denied, 528 U.S. 1074 (2000). Similarly, W oessner is 
entitled to plenary review of the District Court's prediction, 
interpretation and application of the gover ning state 
substantive law. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Buf fetta, 230 
F.3d 634, 637 (3d Cir. 2000). W e are required to apply the 
same test that should have been used initially by the 
District Court -- whether the movant can demonstrate that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and it is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(c); Omnipoint Communications Enters., L.P . v. Newtown 
Township, 219 F.3d 240, 242 (3d Cir .), cert. denied, 121 S. 
Ct. 441 (2000). In doing so, we view the evidence and draw 
all inferences in the light most favorable to the non-movant. 
Whiteland Woods, L.P. v. Township of West Whiteland, 193 
F.3d 177, 180 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 
III. Analysis 
 
As an initial matter, we note that the District Court was 
required to apply the law of the forum state, including its 
choice of law provisions. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. 
Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941); Robertson v. Central Jersey 
Bank & Trust Co., 47 F.3d 1268, 1273 (3d Cir. 1995). New 
Jersey has rejected the strict lex loci delicti ("place of the 
wrong") rule for determining the choice of law based on the 
place where the tort occurred. V eazey v. Doremus, 510 A.2d 
1187, 1189 (N.J. 1986). In its place, the New Jersey courts 
have substituted "the more flexible gover nmental-interest 
analysis in choice-of-law decisions." Id.[citations omitted]. 
It is the District Court's application of this gover nmental- 
interest analysis to which Woessner objects on appeal. 
 
Before discussing the governmental-inter est analysis, we 
observe that the scope of our review of the choice of law 
question will not be as broad as the District Court's 
determination. The District Court found that Delaware law 
applied with respect to all issues of liability. We need not 
delve that far, for we note that the application of New 
Jersey's choice of law test proceeds on "an issue-by-issue 
basis." Veazey, 510 A.2d at 1189."Conflicts principles do 
not dictate that all legal issues presented by a single case 
should be decided under the laws of a single state. The 
evaluation of significant relationships and governmental 
 
                                4 
  
interests takes place issue by issue and can lead to the 
application of different bodies of law." Johnson Matthey Inc. 
v. Pennsylvania Mfrs. Ass'n Ins. Co., 593 A.2d 367, 374 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991). We are convinced, at least 
as to the question of which builder's statute applies in this 
case, that the District Court properly applied the law of 
Delaware. 
 
New Jersey's governmental-interest test r equires a two- 
step inquiry. "The first step in the analysis is to determine 
whether a conflict exists between the law of the interested 
states. . . . If an actual conflict exists, the next step is to 
identify the governmental policies underlying the law of 
each state and how those policies are af fected by each 
state's contacts to the litigation and to the parties." Veazey, 
510 A.2d at 1189. Thus, we begin with whether a conflict 
exists between the builder's statutes of New Jersey and 
Delaware. 
 
"The Delaware `Builder's Statute' pr ovides a six year 
limitations1 period on actions for damages, indemnification, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The builder's statutes of both New Jersey and Delaware are technically 
statutes of repose and not statutes of limitation. Though both work to 
extinguish claims after the running of a given period, a statute of repose 
differs in two respects from a statute of limitation. First, the time 
period 
of a statute of repose does not run from the accrual of a cause of action, 
as does a statute of limitations. "With the above backdrop it is safe to 
assert that our statute is not at all a typical statute of limitations, 
for the 
time within which suit may be brought commences with the completion 
of services and construction and is thus `entir ely unrelated to the 
accrual of any cause of action.' " O'Connor v. Altus, 335 A.2d 545, 553 
(N.J. 1975) (citation omitted); see City of Dover v. International 
Telephone 
& Telegraph Corp., 514 A.2d 1086, 1089 (Del. 1986) ("The statute in 
question is truly a statute of repose. It pr events a claim from arising, 
whereas a statute of limitations bars an accrued cause of action."). 
Secondly, statutes of repose serve a dif ferent purpose than traditional 
statutes of limitation. "Statutes of limitations are designed to stimulate 
litigants to prosecute their suits diligently and to avoid burdening our 
courts with stale claims....[T]he statute of r epose does not serve to 
limit 
stale claims as such. Rather, the statute literally confers immunity ten 
years after the performance of services or construction when an injury 
occurs due to a defect or unsafe condition, r egardless of any intended 
useful life of a product." Van Slyke v. Worthington, 628 A.2d 386, 388 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1992) (citations omitted). 
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or contribution for damages resulting fr om personal 
injuries arising out of any deficiency in the construction or 
improvement to any real property or the design, planning, 
supervision, or observation of any such construction." City 
of Dover v. International Telephone & T elegraph Corp., 514 
A.2d 1086, 1088-89 (Del. 1986); see 10 Del. Code S 8127. 
The six year period runs from the earliest of any of a variety 
of dates signaling the completion of construction. 10 Del. 
Code S 8127(b). There is a governmental interest in such 
laws. The Delaware Supreme Court has noted that builder's 
statutes have been enacted in as many as 47 states and 
that "[t]hey are prophylactic measures taken by the 
Legislatures to lessen the construction pr ofessionals' 
exposure to the almost unlimited liability which has 
resulted from the demise of the privity doctrine and the 
imposition of a discovery rule in tort cases." Becker v. 
Hamada, Inc., 455 A.2d 353, 355 (Del. 1982). 
 
The New Jersey builder's statute, N.J. Stat. Ann. 2A:14- 
1.1, does not differ from that of Delawar e in any respect 
material to this litigation. "N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.1 was adopted, 
effective May 18, 1967, as a legislative r esponse to the then 
expanding liability concepts in this jurisdiction concerning 
the legal responsibility of contractors, ar chitects, engineers, 
and others involved in creating improvements to real 
estate." Brown v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 394 A.2d 
397, 404 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978). The primary 
distinction between the two is that Delaware's statute 
provides that no actions may be brought against the 
builder after six years, while New Jersey has chosen to do 
similarly after ten years. Compare 10 Del. Code S 8127(b) 
with N.J. Stat. Ann. 2A:14-1.1. Of course, because the 
current action was brought almost twenty-three years after 
the construction of the Cardox facility, the action would be 
time-barred by either statute, assuming either applied in 
this case. Indeed, Woessner has made no ef fort to 
distinguish between New Jersey's and Delawar e's builder's 
statutes and has "submitted that the outcome is the same 
regardless of which statute of repose is applied." Br. of 
Woessner at 15. 
 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the builder's statutes of 
New Jersey and Delaware differed other than as noted, an 
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evaluation of the relative governmental interests can lead 
only to the conclusion that the District Court pr operly 
applied Delaware law. Woessner notes the following 
considerations favoring the employ of New Jersey law: 
Woessner was a New Jersey resident, was employed by a 
New Jersey company, sought medical assistance in New 
Jersey and was the beneficiary of public aid in New Jersey.2 
"New Jersey has a clearly recognized gover nmental interest 
in the compensation of its domiciliaries." Pine v. Eli Lilly & 
Co., 492 A.2d 1079, 1082 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985). 
Indeed, this consideration is closely related to New Jersey's 
interest in assuring that its residents ar e productive and do 
not become the beneficiaries of public assistance. Schum v. 
Bailey, 578 F.2d 493, 501 (3d Cir .1978) (Gibbons, J., 
concurring). 
 
These domicile-related considerations ar e not, however, 
so important under the governmental-inter est analysis to 
be dispositive of our inquiry. Moreover , the compensation of 
Woessner is only tangentially related to the relevant 
governmental interests that underlie the builder's statutes. 
This point was made in Fantis Foods, Inc. v. North River Ins. 
Co., 753 A.2d 176, 180 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000). 
Though Fantis Foods involved the application of the 
governmental-interest test to an action for property 
insurance coverage between two companies whose principal 
offices were in New Jersey, the Court concluded that New 
York law should apply because the insur ed building was 
located in New York. Id. at 177. 
 
       Notwithstanding New Jersey's undeniable inter est in 
       protecting the rights of its insureds and in promoting 
       responsiveness on the part of its insur ers, those 
       "wholly domestic" concerns [citation omitted] --the only 
       such factors in the case pertaining to New Jersey-- 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Woessner's argument assumes that this Court must make a choice of 
law determination with respect to all issues of liability, and as such its 
focus is on considerations relevant to the question of which state's 
products liability law applies. We find this argument unhelpful to the 
resolution of the choice of law determination, as New Jersey courts have 
unambiguously held that they must proceed on an"issue-by-issue" 
basis. See Veazey, 510 A.2d at 1189; Johnson Matthey, 593 A.2d 367 at 
374. 
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       have considerably less weight than the inter ests of New 
       York in the condition, maintenance and r epair of 
       structures within its borders; the r espective 
       responsibilities, financial and otherwise, of property 
       owners and insurers with respect ther eto; and relevant 
       considerations of hazard, sequence and causation 
       when collapse occurs or is threatened. 
 
Fantis Foods, 753 A.2d at 180. We believe the choice of law 
analysis for this tort claim to be no differ ent. 
 
At root here is each state government's interest in the 
premises liability concerns of its contractors and related 
builders. It is the location of the building, not the 
individuals who might have been tortiously har med,3 that is 
relevant to the choice of which builder's statute to apply. 
Indeed, at least one New Jersey court has recognized that 
the state governmental interest inher ent in each builder's 
statute cannot be divorced from the situs of that 
construction. In Van Slyke v. Worthington, 628 A.2d 386 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1992), the Superior Court, Law 
Division, held that New Jersey's builder's statute did not 
apply because all of the alleged injuries occurr ed in New 
York buildings, and thus New York law should apply. The 
court stated: 
 
       I find that New York's contacts and inter est in this case 
       are more significant than that of New Jersey's. New 
       Jersey's only interest in this suit lies in ensuring the 
       compensation of its domiciliary--plaintiffs. Clearly, this 
       interest would not be furthered thr ough the operation 
       of New Jersey's substantive law and therefor e the 
       operation of N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.1. . . . Additionally, New 
       York has a far more compelling inter est in regulating 
       dangers inherent in construction activity conducted on 
       its soil. The forgoing [sic] inter nal state needs would 
       not be advanced by application of the [New Jersey 
       builder's] statute to New York realty. Clearly New York 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. It is for this reason that we find W oessner's argument that she was 
only fortuitously located in Delaware and thus New Jersey law should 
thus apply to her, see Blakesley v. Wolford, 789 F.2d 236, 243 (3d Cir. 
1986), to be unpersuasive. 
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       State has the paramount interest in this litigation and 
       therefor its substantive law should gover n this case. 
 
Van Slyke, 628 A.2d at 391-92. W e find Van Slyke and 
Fantis Foods to be compelling, and thus we pr edict that a 
New Jersey court applying New Jersey's choice of law 
analysis would find that Delaware's inter est in the conduct 
of construction activities in that State outweigh New 
Jersey's interest in the compensation of its r esidents. 
 
We turn to the District Court's analysis of Delaware's 
builder's statute and determine whether the Court 
appropriately awarded Olsen and Inter national Switchboard 
the benefits of that statute. The statute bars, after six years 
from the earliest of certain defined dates marking the 
termination of construction, any claim arising"[f]rom any 
alleged deficiency in the construction or manner of 
construction of an improvement to real pr operty and/or in 
the designing, planning, supervision and/or observation of 
any such construction or manner of construction." 10 Del. 
Code S 8127(b)(1). Woessner argues that this statute should 
not bar her action against International Switchboard and 
Olsen because the motor control center was not an 
"improvement to real property" covered by the statute.4 
Whether the motor control center is an "impr ovement" 
under the statute is a question of law and thus 
appropriately resolved on a motion for summary judgment. 
Hiab Cranes & Loaders, Inc. v. Service Unlimited, Inc., C.A. 
No. 82C-FE-98, at 3 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 16, 1983). 
 
"Improvement" is defined in the statute to "include 
buildings, highways, roads, streets, bridges, entrances and 
walkways of any type constructed thereon, and other 
structures affixed to and on land, as well as the land itself." 
10 Del. Code S 8127(a)(2). This list, however , is intended to 
be exemplary and not exhaustive. "As a matter of statutory 
construction, the words `shall include' ar e properly 
interpreted to indicate that the term`structure' 
encompasses items not expressly enumerated in the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Woessner appears not to challenge on appeal the District Court's 
conclusion that both Olsen and International Switchboard performed or 
furnished construction services and wer e not merely suppliers of 
construction equipment. 
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statute." City of Dover, 514 A.2d at 1089 (finding that a 
utility pole can be a "structure" within the meaning of the 
statute because "it is unquestionably affixed to land"). 
 
Delaware courts have employed various means to 
determine whether a particular construction is an 
"improvement" to land. The first case addressing the issue, 
Hiab Cranes & Loaders, Inc. v. Service Unlimited, Inc., C.A. 
No. 82C-FE-98 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 16, 1983), looked to 
the definition of improvement in other states and found 
that two approaches were widely employed-- a common 
law fixture analysis and a "common sense" interpretation 
defining the term according to common usage. Hiab at 3-4. 
On the first approach, the Hiab court cited Pennsylvania 
law for the proposition that "while a fixture is, by definition, 
an improvement to real property, the converse is not true; 
an improvement to real property[,] in the ordinary sense of 
the term, need not be a fixture." Hiab at 4 (citing Keeler v. 
Commonwealth Dep't of Transp., 424 A.2d 614, 616 ( Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1981)). Of the second approach, the Hiab 
court cited with approval Brown v. Central Jersey Power & 
Light Co., 394 A.2d 397, 405-06 (N.J. Super . Ct. App. Div. 
1978), which contrasted permanent parts of the mechanical 
systems necessary to the normal function of a building 
from those "chattels brought into a structure after it is 
architecturally and mechanically suitable for occupancy for 
the purpose intended, . . . e.g., furnitur e, production 
machinery, appliances, etc."-- the former being 
improvements, the latter not. Id. at 405-06. The Hiab court 
went on to find that a building's furnace was an 
improvement covered by the statute. Hiab at 5. 
 
Woessner argues that the motor contr ol center is not an 
improvement to real property because it is "production 
machinery" as noted in Brown, and her claims therefore are 
not barred by Delaware's builder's statute. This argument 
is unpersuasive for several reasons. First, the only 
reference in Delaware case law to the fact that "production 
machinery" is not covered is the citation of Brown 
contained in the Hiab decision of the Delaware Superior 
Court.5 Yet because the furnace in Hiab was not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The genesis of the "production machinery" comment in Brown further 
demonstrates why the motor control center should be covered by 
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"production machinery," this refer ence is, at best, dicta. 
More importantly, a subsequent Delaware case found 
production machinery to be an improvement to real 
property. Davis v. Catalytic, Inc., Nos. 82C-AU-39, 82C-OC- 
84, 1985 WL 189329 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985). In Davis, the 
Superior Court analyzed the Hiab decision's use of a 
"common sense" approach and found that, under that 
approach, a "slurry cooler" was an impr ovement to real 
property and its builder was entitled to pr otection under 10 
Del. Code S 8127. Davis, 1985 WL 189329, at * 5. The 
"slurry cooler" was a sizable free-standing structure bolted 
to the concrete floor and affixed to the adjacent pieces of 
the production process. Id. It is similar to the motor control 
center here, which was also bolted to the concr ete floor and 
affixed to the other elements of the production process. See 
Standard Chlorine of Delaware, Inc. v. Dover Steel Co., 1988 
WL 32044, *2 (Del. Super. Ct. March 31, 1988) (holding 
that a liquid storage tank "attached to the r ealty through a 
system of pipes, valves, manifolds, wires, scaf folds, 
catwalks and a foundation" was an improvement to 
property). Furthermore, both the motor control center and 
"slurry cooler" were an integral part of the respective 
purposes of the buildings. See Windley v. Potts Welding & 
Boiler Repair Co., 888 F. Supp. 610, 613 (D. Del. 1995) 
(finding a preheater that was "central to the plant's 
function" to be an improvement). Thus, we pr edict that a 
Delaware court would find the motor contr ol center to be 
an improvement under the "common sense" approach 
employed in Hiab and Davis. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Delaware's builder's statute. The Brown decision relied heavily uponIlich 
v. John E. Smith Sons Co., 367 A.2d 1216 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1976), which held that a defendant who wired a meat grinding machine 
during the conversion of a building from a theater to a butcher shop 
could not claim the benefit of the builder's statute in New Jersey. Brown, 
394 A.2d at 405. There was no evidence that the meat grinding machine 
was in any way affixed to the building and the court expressly stated 
that it was not a fixture. Ilich, 367 A.2d at 1217-18. The court in Brown, 
however, described Ilich as involving a "meat grinding production 
machine," and seems to have extrapolated ther efrom the general 
comment that production machines were not covered by the builder's 
statute. Brown, 394 A.2d at 405. Obviously, production machines that 
are fixtures, as the motor contr ol center was, can be covered by the 
builder's statute. Davis, 1985 WL 189329, at *5. 
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We caution, however, that the "common sense" approach 
advocated by Woessner was not adopted by the Delaware 
Supreme Court in its only statement on the matter. In City 
of Dover, that Court seemed to employ a fixtur es analysis 
by relying on the "other structures affixed to and on land" 
clause in the definition of "improvement." City of Dover, 514 
A.2d at 1089-90 (citing 10 Del. Code S 8127(a)(2)). The 
Court stated that a "utility pole can be consider ed a 
`structure' within the meaning of the statute. Since it is 
unquestionably affixed to land, it can be consider ed an 
`improvement' covered by that statute." Id. at 1090. 
Employing a strict fixtures analysis lends even stronger 
support to the conclusion that the motor contr ol center was 
an improvement, as it had been installed in 1973, was 
affixed to the concrete floor by bolts for the entire lifetime 
of the structure leading up to the accident and was an 
integral part of the production process. Seen in this light, 
the motor control center is indistinguishable from a circuit 
breaker box,6 which was also held to be a "permanent 
fixture" in Kirkwood Dodge, Inc. v. Fr ederic G. Krapf, Jr., 
Inc., C.A. No. 84C-DE-81, slip. op. at 3-4 (Del. Super. Ct. 
May 9, 1989).7 
 
We are convinced that the motor contr ol center was 
intended to be a permanent fixture for the lifetime of the 
Air Liquide facility and that it was covered by the Delaware 
builder's statute. Alternatively, were we to employ the 
"common sense" approach to improvements, we are 
convinced that the motor control center was an 
improvement, indeed an indispensible one, to the Air 
Liquide facility. 
 
For the reasons noted, we conclude that the District 
Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of both 
Olsen and International Switchboard. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Indeed, one of Woessner's expert witnesses likened the motor control 
center to a "circuit breaker box in the home." 
 
7. The Court in Kirkwood Dodge went on to hold, however, that a 
supplier of a standard circuit breaker box did not "furnish construction" 
under the builder's statute. Kirkwood Dodge, Inc., at 4-5. 
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